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Editors’ Summary
Offsets, and in particular international offsets, have 
been advanced as an important tool in climate policy, 
capable of significantly reducing the costs of emissions 
reductions . As attention turns to the existing CAA as a 
potential vehicle for general reduction of GHG emis-
sions, an important question is whether regulation 
under the statute is compatible with international off-
sets . Certain regulatory programs under the CAA are 
likely candidates for GHG regulation, but many of 
them are legally incompatible with international offsets . 
Those programs that might permit use of international 
offsets have other problems that make them unpopular 
choices for GHG regulation . To the extent that CAA 
regulation depends on state action, state law and consti-
tutional limitations appear to offer more barriers than 
opportunities for use of international offsets . These con-
clusions have implications for the costs and flexibility of 
climate policy under the CAA .
With the U .S . Congress’ failure to date to create comprehensive climate legislation, attention has turned to moves by the U .S . Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
under the existing Clean Air Act (CAA) .1 Among the many 
questions raised by this shift are whether and how policy 
instruments such as emissions trading and offsets can be 
incorporated into CAA regulation . This Article will briefly 
analyze whether that statute provides any plausible basis for 
use of international GHG offsets for stationary sources .2 The 
foundation for almost all of the analysis presented here is the 
CAA itself—no federal court rulings and very few scholarly 
analyses have addressed this question .
The Article briefly discusses offsets as a policy mechanism 
and the history of their use within the CAA, before detail-
ing the potential for incorporation of offsets into various 
CAA programs that might plausibly be used for regulation 
of GHGs .
For various reasons discussed in detail below, none of these 
programs seems readily compatible with use of international 
offsets in the GHG context . Those programs that might be 
compatible are a poor fit for GHG regulation generally . Pro-
grams that are better candidates for GHG regulation contain 
statutory restrictions that require, at best, creative and legally 
questionable reinterpretation in order to be compatible with 
international offsets . State-level regulation under the CAA 
faces similar challenges and restrictions along with addi-
tional barriers that may exist in state law .
I. Offsets and the CAA
A. Offsets as a Policy Mechanism
Offsets are an environmental policy mechanism in which 
an emitter of a pollutant may increase emissions or avoid 
required reductions in emissions by committing to reduc-
tions in emissions elsewhere . This commitment—the off-
set—may come from the same facility, a different facility 
under the same owner, or as a result of a contractual agree-
ment between different emitters . The general result of offset 
use is that emissions in the relevant area are at least no greater 
than before their use, but that trade offs are possible between 
various emitting activities and facilities . Relative to a ban on 
any emissions increases or individually mandated emissions 
reductions, offsetting should be able to achieve equivalent 
1 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
2 . That is, electricity-generation plants, industrial facilities, etc . Emissions from 
vehicles—mobile sources—are regulated under separate CAA provisions and 
are not discussed here .
Author’s Note: I thank Richard Morgenstern for asking the question 
that inspired this Article, and Art Fraas for helpful comments and 
advice. All remaining errors are my own.
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environmental results at lower cost since higher value uses of 
a limited emissions “resource” can be prioritized .
Offsets have been recognized as a useful policy mecha-
nism for some time, and have been a part of environmental 
regulation in the United States for more than 30 years . They 
have attracted increased interest recently due to their poten-
tially large role in controlling the costs of GHG emissions 
reductions .3 Some industries and countries are able to reduce 
GHG emissions more cheaply than others . To the extent that 
emissions cuts beyond those mandated by regulations can 
be traded as offsets, the global cost of GHG reductions can 
be substantially decreased . Though some problems exist with 
accurately determining whether reductions are “additional” 
(whether they go beyond what would have been achieved 
anyway), offsets are generally recognized as a key part of any 
international effort to reduce GHG emissions . International 
offsets have figured prominently in climate legislation under 
consideration in Congress .4 Because this legislation has 
stalled, however, attention has partially shifted to potential 
regulation of GHGs by EPA under the existing CAA .
B. Existing Offset Programs Under the CAA
Offsets have been a formal part of EPA regulation at least 
since the 1977 Amendments to the CAA . Under the statute, 
EPA is charged with setting uniform national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQS) .5 Areas that fail to meet these 
standards are designated as nonattainment areas .6 Such areas 
are subject to strict regulation, including an effective ban 
on construction of major new facilities or major modifica-
tions to existing facilities that emit pollutants for which the 
area is above the NAAQS—unless emissions from the new 
or modified facility are offset .7 The Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) provisions of the 1977 CAA Amend-
ments allow such facilities to be built only if they install tight 
emissions controls (lowest achievable emission rate (LAER))8 
and can offset the additional emissions from the new facil-
ity with reductions elsewhere .9 These reductions can be from 
other facilities within the same firm, or from other firms in 
the same nonattainment area .10 Firms that verifiably reduce 
emissions beyond what is required by regulation receive emis-
sions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be traded to firms 
that need to offset emissions from a new facility .11 ERCs can 
3 . See, e.g., Daniel S . Hall, Offsets: Incentivizing Reductions While Managing Un-
certainty and Ensuring Integrity (Resources for the Future, Issue Brief CPF No . 
15, Nov . 2007), available at http://www .rff .org/RFF/Documents/CPF_17_Is-
sueBrief_15 .pdf; see also Energy Info . Admin ., Publ’n No . SR/OIAF/2009-
05, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H .R . 2454, the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, at ix (2009) .
4 . See House Comm . on Energy & Commerce, Summary: American Clean En-
ergy and Security Act (H .R . 2454), at 2 (June 9, 2009), available at http://
energycommerce .house .gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary .pdf 
(identifying offsets as a major component of the Act) .
5 . 42 U .S .C . §7409(a)(1) (2007), ELR Stat . CAA §109(a)(1) .
6 . CAA §107(d)(1)(A)(i) .
7 . CAA §173(a) .
8 . CAA §171(3) .
9 . CAA §173(c) .
10 . CAA §173(c)(1) .
11 . U .S . EPA, National Center for Environmental Economics: Offset Program, 
http://yosemite .epa .gov/ee/Epalib/incent .nsf/c484aff385a753cd85256c2c00
generally only be used within the same nonattainment area 
they are created .12
These ERCs and the offset program in general have 
become important mechanisms in regulation of nonattain-
ment areas for the six pollutants currently regulated under 
the NAAQS (tropospheric ozone, nitrous oxides, sulfur diox-
ide, particulate matter [PM2 .5 and PM10], and lead) . They are, 
however, much more limited in scope than those generally 
proposed in the GHG context . This is largely a reflection of 
the local character of the pollutants traditionally regulated 
under the CAA . ERCs—CAA offsets—are not tradable 
across the United States or internationally . They also are 
only relevant when CAA regulations would otherwise pre-
vent construction of a new emitting facility—they cannot be 
used to avoid or mitigate the impact of regulations on emis-
sions from existing facilities . An emitter facing, for example, 
a regulatory requirement to install certain control technol-
ogy under the CAA cannot use an ERC to avoid having to 
make that investment .
II. International Offsets Under the CAA at 
the Federal Level
Given this past experience with offsets under the CAA, the 
need for offsets to manage the costs of international GHG 
regulation, and the increasing likelihood that short-term 
GHG regulation in the United States will be accomplished in 
large part through the CAA, what avenues are legally plau-
sible for integrating international offsets into CAA GHG 
regulation? This section will address three such potential 
avenues: the CAA permitting programs (the vehicle for tra-
ditional CAA ERCs); New Source Performance Standards 
(NSPS) under §111 of the CAA; and more speculative pro-
grams under CAA §§115 or 615 . None of these, however, 
seem to provide a solid legal foundation for international 
offsets . Any effort to include international offsets in federal 
CAA GHG regulation would therefore have to be based on 
tenuous and untested legal theories .
A. Traditional-Style Offsets: Permitting and the 
NAAQS
The existing offset program under permitting schemes (PSD 
and New Source Review (NSR)) in the CAA would provide 
the strongest precedential foundation for a GHG offset pro-
gram . Unfortunately, there appears to be no legal basis for 
an internationalization of this program . ERCs can only be 
created when emissions are reduced by a source in a nonat-
tainment area . Reductions in emissions from foreign sources 
therefore could never qualify for ERCs—foreign countries 
57ce35/1fde15e82ad9cb50852564ec007aa24e!OpenDocument (last visited 
June 19, 2010) .
12 . CAA §173(c)(1) . The only exception is where another nonattainment area has 
equal or higher levels of the relevant pollutant and emissions from that other 
area contribute to the nonattainment status of the area where the ERC was 
created . For the primarily local pollutants regulated under the NAAQS, this in 
practice means that ERCs can only be used where they are created or in nearby 
or upwind areas .
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cannot be out of attainment with respect to U .S . national air 
quality standards .
There are also significant conceptual and practical prob-
lems with regulation of GHGs under the NAAQS (as would 
be required for any areas to be in nonattainment and there-
fore eligible for use of ERC offsets) . Few who have studied 
CAA GHG regulation favor a NAAQS approach . Among 
the largest of these conceptual problems is that the globally 
uniform nature of GHG pollution would require the entire 
United States to be either in attainment or nonattainment, 
and that, as a result, different rules for attainment and nonat-
tainment areas would have little meaning .
If GHGs were regulated under the NAAQS and the stan-
dard set at a level placing the entire United States in non-
attainment, some nationwide offsetting would be possible . 
Emissions of GHGs from any area would affect compliance 
with the NAAQS everywhere else in the country due to 
atmospheric mixing of GHGs, and any additional reductions 
in GHG emissions would therefore qualify for ERCs that 
could be used anywhere in the country . Although this would 
undoubtedly be useful, it does nothing to allow the use of 
international offsets . As mentioned above, areas outside the 
United States cannot be in nonattainment, even if their 
emissions contribute to U .S . concentrations . In this respect, 
the CAA is designed to deal with local or at most national 
pollution problems—not global pollutants like GHGs .
If GHGs were not regulated under the NAAQS, or the 
NAAQS set at a level that put the entire United States in 
attainment, permitting requirements would still exist but be 
subject to a different standard . All stationary sources that 
emit pollutants regulated under the CAA are subject to NSR 
when they are initially built or undergo major modifica-
tion .13 Outside of nonattainment areas, this permit requires 
the use of best available control technology (BACT) .14 EPA is 
charged with determining whether a facility seeking a permit 
has implemented BACT . This determination is case-by-case, 
but is guided by a “clearinghouse” set up by EPA to pro-
vide information on technologies that meet BACT and other 
standards required in the CAA .15
Could EPA define BACT so as to include international 
offsets? If so, no NAAQS regulation would be necessary (at 
least for offsets to be brought into CAA regulation) . Unfor-
tunately, the answer seems to be no . BACT is defined in the 
CAA as:
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree 
of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under 
this chapter emitted from or which results from any major 
emitting facility, which the permitting authority  .  .  . deter-
mines is achievable for such facility through application of 
production processes and available methods, systems, and 
techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treat-
13 . CAA §165(a) .
14 . CAA §165(a)(4) .
15 . U .S . EPA, RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse (RBLC), http://cfpub .epa .
gov/RBLC/ (last visited June 20, 2010) .
ment or innovate fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each pollutant .16
There are two ways in which this definition appears to 
block incorporation of offsets into BACT . First, the language 
strongly implies that BACT is a purely technological stan-
dard . References to “processes  .   .   . methods, systems, and 
techniques” and the specific examples given (such as “fuel 
cleaning”) indicate that technology, not trading or offsetting, 
is to be the basis of BACT . One might argue that offsets are 
a “method” or a “system” of controlling emissions, but this 
may stretch the meaning of these terms beyond their break-
ing point in the context of the statute .
A larger problem for offsets is the apparent requirement 
that BACT must control emissions from the facility seek-
ing a permit . BACT is defined as being based on reduc-
tions in emissions of pollutants “emitted from  .  .  . any major 
facility” that EPA determines is “achievable for such facil-
ity .” Reductions in emissions at other facilities appear to be 
explicitly excluded .
One possible way to escape this requirement stems from 
the fact that BACT is not a specific requirement that a given 
technology or “method” be implemented, but a standard 
based on the emissions reductions that identified technolo-
gies make possible . Even if offsets cannot be considered when 
BACT is set, therefore, it might be possible for them to be 
considered in determining whether BACT is met . There is 
no apparent precedent for this, however . If it were legal, one 
would expect domestic offsetting programs under BACT for 
pollutants already regulated under the CAA, and no such 
programs exist .
Finally, even if international offsets could be used to fulfill 
NSR requirements, new and modified facilities would still 
face requirements under CAA NSPS . For reasons discussed 
in the next section, it appears unlikely that offsets could be 
used under NSPS regulation . NSR offsets might therefore 
have limited value, even if they could be legally implemented .
B. Offsets Under CAA Performance Standards
Given the problems mentioned above with regulation of 
GHGs under the NAAQS program, most (but not all) who 
have studied the issue appear to favor regulating GHGs under 
the NSPS . NSPS GHG regulation is explicitly funded under 
President Barack Obama’s proposed fiscal year 2011 budget .17 
Under the NSPS, EPA is charged with dividing emitters into 
“source categories” and creating performance standards for 
new and modified sources within the category .18 The Agency 
is further charged under §111(d) of the CAA with creation 
of guidelines under which states implement performance 
standards for existing sources .19 The remainder of this section 
16 . CAA §169(3) .
17 . See Office of Mgmt . & Budget, Budget of the United States Govern-
ment: Fiscal Year 2011, at 126 (2010), available at http://www .whitehouse .
gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/environmental .pdf (stating: “The Budget also 
requests $7 million to develop New Source Performance Standards to control 
GHG emissions from a few categories of major stationary sources .”) .
18 . CAA §111 .
19 . CAA §111(d) .
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discusses the permissibility of international offsets within 
federal NSPS regulation—offsets under state regulation of 
existing sources will be discussed below .
Traditionally, the NSPS have been technological stan-
dards, requiring emissions sources to implement “adequately 
demonstrated” technologies or take other measures to 
achieve an equivalent reduction in emissions .20 This would 
superficially appear to rule out offsets or indeed any market-
based approach under the NSPS—the standards appear to 
be traditional command-and-control regulation . This view 
may not be entirely accurate, however . The CAA defines 
“standard of performance” as “a standard for emissions of 
air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limita-
tion achievable through the application of the best system of 
emission reduction  .  .  . which the Administrator determines 
has been adequately demonstrated .”21 Might “best system of 
emission reduction” be interpreted to mean, for example, an 
emissions trading system or offsets?
There is precedent for this understanding of the definition . 
At least one emissions trading system, for waste incinerators, 
has been implemented under the NSPS .22 EPA also planned 
to create a trading scheme for mercury emissions in its Clean 
Air Mercury Rule .23 That rule was struck down by courts on 
other grounds .24 EPA therefore believes that emissions trad-
ing is permissible under the NSPS despite the foundations of 
the program in technology standards . If the statutory lan-
guage is flexible enough to permit this interpretation, would 
it also allow inclusion of a system for international offsets?
This is an untested legal question, but the best answer 
appears to be “maybe, but probably not .” At minimum, 
implementing an international offset program through NSPS 
regulation is legally risky . Looking beyond the relatively 
ambiguous “best system of emission reduction” language in 
the definition, other language in §111 more clearly indicates 
that the NSPS are intended to be technologically driven . 
The section refers repeatedly to “technological system[s] of 
emissions reduction” as the basis of NSPS standards, a term 
clearly defined in the statute as (not surprisingly) a techno-
logical standard—examples given in the statute are “precom-
bustion cleaning or treatment of fuels” and the like .25 This 
language, combined with the traditional implementation of 
NSPS standards in technological terms, make exploitation of 
the ambiguity in the best system of emission reduction defi-
nition to allow for implementation of nontechnological con-
trol methods such as offsets legally difficult . Complicating 
the issue further, “standard of performance” is given a dif-
ferent definition elsewhere in the CAA that does not include 
20 . CAA §111(a)(1) .
21 . Id.
22 . See 40 C .F .R . §60 .33b(d)(2) (2009) (stating: “A State plan may establish a 
program to allow owners or operators of municipal waste combustor plants to 
engage in trading of nitrogen oxides emission credits . A trading program must 
be approved by EPA before implementation .”) .
23 . See U .S . EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule: Basic Information, http://www .epa .
gov/mercuryrule/basic .htm (last visited June . 20, 2010) (stating: “The Clean 
Air Mercury Rule established a cap-and-trade system for mercury that is based 
on EPA’s proven Acid Rain Program .”) .
24 . New Jersey v . EPA, 517 F .3d 574, 578, 38 ELR 20046 (D .C . Cir . 2008) .
25 . CAA §111(a)(7) .
the ambiguous best system of emission reduction language 
(though it does not explicitly require technological standards 
either) .26 Courts are therefore likely to carefully scrutinize 
EPA attempts to broadly interpret §111 .27
To some extent, this argument against offsets being per-
missible under NSPS regulation proves too much—if taken 
to its logical conclusion, a narrow reading of the definition 
of “standard of performance” forbids not only the use of 
offsets but of emissions trading programs (of which at least 
one example exists) . This existence of regulatory (though not 
legal) precedent is helpful to future efforts to create emissions 
trading programs under NSPS regulation; however, there is 
no such precedent for offsets, though trading and offsets are 
conceptually similar in many respects .28 International offsets 
present a further problem in that international emissions 
sources are not mentioned at all in §111—there is similarly 
no precedent for any consideration of international emis-
sions in NSPS programs . While the legal issues are complex 
and impossible to predict with certainty, it appears unlikely 
that an EPA effort to incorporate international offsets into 
NSPS GHG regulation would survive challenge in court . It 
cannot be ruled out, however, and at least stands a chance 
of being permissible .
C. Offsets Under More Speculative CAA Programs
Some have proposed regulating GHGs under rarely used 
sections of the CAA that, due to their brevity, may pro-
vide EPA with greater regulatory discretion . The two CAA 
sections most often proposed are §115,29 governing inter-
national emissions, and §615,30 part of the CAA’s Title 
VI provisions aimed at pollutants that damage the ozone 
layer . The chief attraction of regulating GHGs under 
these provisions, as opposed to the much more detailed 
provisions governing CAA programs like the NSPS and 
26 . CAA §302(l) .
27 . This is a complicated issue of statutory interpretation and results are difficult 
to predict . For more analysis of interpretations of the relevant language in the 
related context of whether emissions trading is permitted under the NSPS, see 
Nathan Richardson et al ., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: 
Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway (Resources for the 
Future, RFF Discussion Paper No . 10-23, 2010) . See also Inimai M . Chettiar 
& Jason A . Schwartz, Inst . for Policy Integrity, The Road Ahead: EPA’s 
Options and Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases (2009), 
available at http://policyintegrity .org/files/publications/TheRoadAhead .pdf .
28 . As discussed in the text, there appears to be no case law indicating whether the 
statutory language of the CAA permits NSPS regulation with emissions trad-
ing . There is nevertheless practical precedent for the practice, created by the 
program for waste incinerators discussed above (see note 22 and accompanying 
text) . While the Clean Air Mercury Rule was invalidated by the U .S Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on other grounds (see supra 
notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text) and therefore did not create an actual 
regulatory program, the Agency’s inclusion of trading mechanisms under the 
NSPS indicates, at least, that it believes they are within the latitude granted by 
the statute . Use of offsets under the NSPS also has no precedent in case law, 
but in contrast to emissions trading, has no apparent precedent in either actual 
regulatory programs or proposed rules .
29 . See Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep ., Mar . 9, 2009, at 5, avail-
able at http://www .sidley .com/files/Publication/c789bb2a-7562-4149-8474-
036f21dee348/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3a6fe43a-22d1-4715-
9f69-04c17efdbd00/GreenhouseGases .pdf .
30 . See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed . 
Reg . 44354, 44519 (proposed July 30, 2008) .
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NAAQS that are actually in use, is the fact that they have 
almost none of the restrictions, definitions, and requirements 
that limit EPA discretion .
Using §115 or §615 as the primary vehicle for GHG 
regulation under the CAA might allow EPA to incorporate 
international offsets into GHG regulation—there is little in 
these CAA provisions to prevent it . The problem with general 
regulation under these provisions is that it is legally untested 
and likely to be viewed by courts with skepticism . As I have 
written elsewhere, such sweeping regulation under §115 (or 
§615) may not be legal .31 Courts usually disfavor attempts 
by agencies to use short, vague statutory language to justify 
sweeping regulatory changes . As Justice Antonin Scalia has 
put it: “Congress does not  .  .  . hide elephants in mouseholes.”32 
Such broad regulation of GHG emissions under §115 (indeed, 
any GHG regulation under the CAA) is highly likely to be 
challenged in the courts . The same brevity in the section that 
grants EPA the desired regulatory flexibility will be a weak 
point, likely a fatal one, in such a challenge . In other words, 
the same lack of specificity that allows EPA to include off-
set provisions in regulation under these sections makes such 
regulation legally questionable .
A different but related approach would be to regulate 
GHGs primarily under more established sections of the 
CAA, such as §110 (NAAQS) or §111 (NSPS), but to use 
§115 as a vehicle for international aspects of GHG regula-
tion, potentially including offsets . Section 115 allows EPA 
broad discretion to instruct states to regulate emissions when 
domestic regulation is insufficient to prevent harm to foreign 
countries .33 EPA might therefore conclude that, even after 
domestic GHG regulation under §110 or §111, other coun-
tries are still at risk and use §115 to impose additional regula-
tory requirements on states . The lack of specificity in §115 
discussed above might allow EPA to include international 
offsets in any such scheme . 
This approach is more legally plausible than general GHG 
regulation under §115 . First, the scale of regulation under 
§115 is smaller . EPA would not be attempting to create an 
economywide GHG regulatory program under a four-para-
graph, never-used section of the statute, but rather using that 
section as the basis for one or a few components of a larger 
program justified elsewhere in the statute . Second, those 
parts of the program that did fall under §115 would seem 
to fit better with the stated subject of that section—interna-
tional air pollution .
Significant problems would remain, however, that make 
this approach legally suspect . First, there is some tension 
between the language of §115 and offsets themselves . Sec-
tion 115 is aimed at reductions in “pollutants emitted in 
the United States [that] cause or contribute to air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare in a foreign country .”34 Offsets generally 
31 . See Richardson et al ., supra note 27 .
32 . Whitman v . Am . Trucking Ass’ns, Inc ., 531 U .S . 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512 
(2001) .
33 . CAA §115(b) . The foreign country must also grant the United States recipro-
cal rights .
34 . CAA §115(a) .
would have the opposite effect—they would allow states to 
export emissions (and, therefore, endangerment) to foreign 
countries . This is less true for GHGs since they are uniformly 
distributed globally—to the extent that offsets would result 
in lower global emissions, foreign countries would benefit 
just as much as the state in which the offset is used . Still, 
offsets would not result in any reduction in “pollutants emit-
ted in the United States” and therefore seem at odds with the 
plain language of §115 .35
The second problem is that courts may view an interna-
tional offset program as an “elephant in a mousehole” just as 
they likely would a general GHG regulatory program . The 
former is smaller and less complex, to be sure, but is still 
likely to involve substantial new regulation and creation of 
a large international offset market . Section 115 may not pro-
vide sufficient legal basis on which to ground such a regula-
tory scheme .
The chief advantage of regulating GHGs primarily under 
well-tested provisions of the CAA and restricting the use of 
§115 to offsets is not, therefore, that the legal foundation for 
use of offsets or use of §115 for any GHG regulation are sig-
nificantly stronger, but that these questions can be separated 
from the broader GHG regulatory scheme . If a court rules 
that §115 cannot be used in this way, the remainder of the 
GHG regulatory scheme can stand alone—though it would 
be more expensive .
III. Offsets as State-Level CAA Regulation
The previous sections have dealt with federal regulation 
under the CAA . CAA programs and enforcement are not 
restricted to EPA or the federal government generally, how-
ever . The largest programs within the CAA for stationary 
source regulation, the NSPS and NAAQS, have substantial 
state-level components, and the CAA is generally viewed as 
an exercise in “cooperative federalism .” State governments 
do not face many of the restrictions placed on EPA by the 
CAA and separation-of-powers doctrines, and have sub-
stantial flexibility to implement policies to meet (or exceed) 
CAA requirements . It is therefore worth exploring whether 
states operating under the NAAQS or NSPS would be able 
to include international offsets in their component of CAA 
GHG regulation .
A. State Regulation Under the NAAQS
Under the NAAQS, states are responsible for creating state 
implementation plans (SIPs) that detail how state regula-
tory efforts will result in air quality that meets or exceeds 
the national standards . EPA must evaluate these plans and 
may approve or reject them—only if an SIP is rejected can 
EPA directly implement regulation through a federal imple-
mentation plan (FIP) . The Agency can also make “SIP calls” 
in which it requests revisions of existing SIPs . EPA can make 
35 . This would not necessarily be an issue with a GHG regulatory scheme entirely 
under §115 authority, as such a scheme would presumably result in reductions 
in U .S . emissions, even if §115’s flexibility allowed offsets to be included .
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recommendations and retains final approval authority over 
SIPs, but cannot dictate the regulatory policies that states 
implement beyond determining whether they fulfill the 
requirements of the CAA . This process has in the past been 
a vehicle for integration of emissions trading schemes into 
NAAQS regulation, with EPA issuing a “model” set of reg-
ulations that states may then implement in their SIPs .36 The 
practical result is a full emissions trading program under 
the NAAQS, but it is states, not EPA, that actually imple-
ment the program . EPA could only directly implement a 
NAAQS program if it rejects states’ SIPs and instead imple-
ments an FIP .37
In principle, it would likely be possible for EPA to include 
international offsets in a model rule for states . Section 110(a)
(2)(A) of the CAA lists regulatory mechanisms that states 
can use in their SIPs: “Enforceable emissions limitations 
and other control measures, means, or techniques (includ-
ing economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, 
and auctions of emissions rights) .”38 This language appears 
to be sufficiently broad to encompass offsets . Offsets could 
easily be characterized as a “control measure[  ], means, or 
technique[  ]”, and the mention of “economic incentives” 
seems to indicate that Congress intended to give broad flex-
ibility to the states . On the other hand, some such economic 
incentives are mentioned, while offsets are not . The list is not 
exclusive, however . Certainly it is much easier to fit offsets 
into this statutory language than it is to characterize them as 
“performance standards” under the NSPS .
If EPA did explicitly include offsets in a model SIP (and, 
in principle, even if it did not), states could then choose 
whether to include offset provisions in their SIPs . If offsets 
were part of a model rule, states would know that if they fol-
lowed the model (including use of offsets), their SIPs would 
be approved . A problem with past use of market mechanisms 
in the SIP process has been the inability of EPA to guaran-
tee that emissions in a given state would cause significant 
air pollution in another state, as courts have held is required 
by the CAA .39 This would likely not be an issue with offsets 
(international or otherwise) in the GHG context, however . 
Because GHGs are globally dispersed pollutants, any reduc-
tion in emissions anywhere should have the same effect on 
ambient GHG levels .
While legally plausible up to this point, this approach 
suffers from the same problems discussed in Section II .A . 
with respect to GHG regulation under the NAAQS—the 
program is not a good fit for the GHG problem, and the fact 
that states have some flexibility does not change that very 
36 . See, e.g., U .S . EPA, Clean Air Markets: NOx Budget Trading Program—Ba-
sic Information, http://www .epa .gov/airmarkets/progsregs/nox/sipbasic .html 
(stating that, under this program, “[c]ap and trade programs set a cap on over-
all regional emissions and allocate each affected source allowances authorizing 
a certain number of tons of emissions”) .
37 . One scholar has proposed that EPA attempt to resolve some of the issues with 
a GHG NAAQS by rejecting all SIPs and implementing a single, nationwide 
FIP . See Jonathan B . Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local 
Climate Policies, 155 U . Pa . L . Rev . 1961, 1967 (2007) .
38 . CAA §110(a)(2)(A) .
39 . North Carolina v . EPA, 531 F .3d 896, 908, 38 ELR 20306a (D .C . Cir . 2008) 
(per curiam) .
much . Just because states may be able to implement offsets or 
emissions trading does not solve larger problems such as the 
level at which a GHG NAAQS should be set or the futility 
of states being forced to plan to meet a standard for a global 
pollutant over which they have little individual control . As 
discussed in Section III .C . below, implementation of offsets 
through state regulation also may create more legal problems, 
some of them constitutional, than it resolves .
B. State Regulation Under the NSPS
As mentioned in Section II .B . above, EPA is charged under 
the CAA with regulation of new and modified stationary 
sources in the NSPS program, while states are charged with 
regulation of existing sources under §111(d) . Regulation 
under §111(d) only comes into play if a pollutant is not regu-
lated under the NAAQS or certain other CAA provisions .40 
Assuming this is the case, §111(d) regulation is similar in 
many ways to the NAAQS process: EPA creates “guidelines” 
for existing source performance standards, and states must 
create a plan for implementation of these standards . The 
Agency then approves or rejects the state plan .
Because of the way in which §111(d) is written, however, 
it does not grant states the same degree of regulatory flexibil-
ity as the NAAQS/SIP process does . States are required by 
this section to regulate through “standards of performance,” 
the same general method—defined in the statute—as EPA 
is directed to use .41 The ambiguity of this term’s definition 
under the CAA is discussed in Section II .B . above, and the 
same analysis would apply to state regulation . As a result, 
prospects for integration of international offsets into state-
driven §111(d) regulation of existing sources seem no greater 
than those for such integration into NSPS programs generally .
C. Other Issues Surrounding State Regulation
While their quasi-sovereign status and the significant delega-
tions of authority within CAA programs grant states greater 
regulatory flexibility, one must be careful not to ignore the 
restrictions that state law places on this flexibility . While 
states taken as a whole have great regulatory discretion, the 
same is true of the federal government . States only appear to 
have more discretion when compared to a single branch of 
the federal government or, as has been done in the sections 
above, with a single federal agency—EPA . In reality, SIPs, 
§111(d) performance standards, and other air pollution regu-
lation by states must be approved by state legislatures or state 
agencies with sufficient authority delegated to them . Imple-
menting a given regulatory scheme, such as international off-
sets, faces similar legal and ultimately political challenges at 
the state level as it does at the federal level . Analysis of the 
legality of international offsets under state law is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but will ultimately be highly relevant 
if state regulation is to be the vehicle for integrating these 
offsets into larger CAA regulation .
40 . CAA §111(d)(1)(A) .
41 . Id.
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States also have the power to go beyond federal environ-
mental regulation, as illustrated in the GHG context by Cali-
fornia’s AB 32 measures42 and regional initiatives such as the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) .43 In principle, 
states acting alone or in groups could implement GHG regu-
lation that includes provisions for international offsets . This 
is true regardless of the form and content of federal CAA 
regulation of GHGs, or even in the absence of any federal 
regulation . Analysis of this possibility is similarly beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is nevertheless relevant and legally 
(if not necessarily politically or practically) realistic .
There is some potential that state regulations that incor-
porate international offsets, whether under delegated CAA 
authority or independent state authority, could be deemed 
to impermissibly interfere with the executive branch foreign 
affairs powers under the U .S . Constitution . How this issue 
would play out would depend on the specific facts of the dis-
pute . States would be less likely to encounter constitutional 
problems if offsets can be characterized as contracts between 
private-party emitters, rather than as a treaty-like arrange-
ment between a state and a foreign country . In general, how-
ever, this issue might never come before a court, as standing 
issues could present a significant barrier .44
IV. Conclusions
There appears to be no solid legal foundation for incorpora-
tion of international offsets in CAA GHG regulation . Off-
sets might be brought in through state-level CAA regulation . 
Because §110(a)(2)(A) is the only CAA provision sufficiently 
broad to grant states the regulatory authority to incorporate 
offsets, the only offset-compatible CAA pathway open to 
EPA would be the NAAQS . This pathway is generally per-
ceived as a poor fit for the GHG problem . Bringing in offsets 
through the more GHG-friendly NSPS program at either 
the federal or state (using §111(d)) level requires creative 
interpretation of CAA language (specifically, whether off-
sets are “standards of performance”) that may not hold up 
in court . State efforts to integrate international offsets under 
delegated CAA authority also require authorization under 
state law, and may be subject to challenge on constitutional 
grounds . Other CAA programs, such as §115, might allow 
EPA to implement offset programs without state involve-
ment, but regulation of GHGs under these programs at all 
is legally suspect .
42 . See California Air Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming So-
lutions Act, http://www .arb .ca .gov/cc/ab32/ab32 .htm (stating that, among 
other mandates, the California Air Resources Board “shall prepare and approve 
a scoping plan for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of 
sources of greenhouse gases by 2020”) .
43 . See RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (2008), avail-
able at http://www .rggi .org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012 .31 .08 .
pdf .
44 . This question—whether unilateral state action to permit international offsets 
interferes with the executive foreign affairs power—is complex, and a full anal-
ysis is beyond the scope of this Article .
As a result, it appears that new federal or at least state 
legislation is required to incorporate international offsets into 
U .S . GHG regulation . Use of offsets—and the cost savings 
they would likely bring—should therefore be considered a 
major advantage of comprehensive climate legislation over 
the CAA tools currently available to EPA .
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